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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, increasing public awareness about 
environmental issues prompted a flurry of congressional activity directed at cleaning and 
protecting the environment.1  One of the pieces of legislation passed during this period 
was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
commonly known as Superfund or CERCLA.2  CERCLA, which is administered by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), established stringent 
standards for the type of cleanup required at contaminated properties and made a wide 
range of parties liable for the cost of remediation at those sites.3  Under the CERCLA 
liability scheme, former, current, and future owners or operators of property may be held 
responsible for cleaning the site,4 and this liability adheres to the party regardless of 
whether they caused the contamination.5  While CERCLA provided the government with 
a powerful set of tools for remediating contaminated property, it resulted in other, less 
desirable consequences as well.  CERCLA’s wide net of liability, in combination with the 
potential for extremely high cleanup costs, resulted in thousands of contaminated sites 
across the country languishing in disuse for fear of the costs they carried with them.6  
These sites became known as brownfields.  The costs of continued disuse of these sites 
could be immense.  Such inactive, unutilized properties not only result in environmental 
and human health problems, loss of tax revenue, and the overuse of greenfields 
(undeveloped suburban land), but also contribute to the growing problem of inner-city 
blight—brownfields are linked to increased crime rates, foster a pervasive sense of 
poverty and hopelessness, and serve as a conspicuous symbol of the decline of the urban, 
poor, and minority neighborhoods in which they are concentrated.7 
                                                 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. 
1 Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalyst for Neighborhood Revitalization, 11 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2000). 
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 
94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)). 
3 Shari Shapiro, The Effectiveness of Pennsylvania’s Act 2: Are Good Mechanisms Enough?, 24 TEMP. J. 
SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 441, 445 (2005).  The remediation, or cleanup, of such sites consists of 
decontaminating the land by reducing the volume, toxicity, or mobility of hazardous substances.  ROBERT 
V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW SCIENCE, AND POLICY 224-26 (2003). 
4 Emily A. Green, The Rustbelt and the Revitalization of Detroit: A Commentary and Criticism of Michigan 
Brownfield Legislation, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 571, 578 (2004). 
5 Espinosa, supra note 1, at 7. 
6 Shapiro, supra note 3, at 446-47 (noting that the cost of remediation may be far higher than the value of 
the land, causing landowners to set aside the land for future use or virtually abandon their properties). 
7 Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and 
Vol. 3:2] Jessica Higgins 
 241
¶2 In response to this unintended consequence of CERCLA, both the federal 
government and state governments enacted legislation to encourage the remediation and 
redevelopment of brownfields.  The federal response was in the form of amendments to 
CERCLA that lower cleanup standards in some cases, provide liability protection for 
certain parties, and provide financial and tax-based incentives to municipalities and 
developers to reuse brownfields in targeted areas.8  States have in turn passed their own 
brownfields legislation to attract developers to brownfields and to take advantage of 
federal funding.  Such state programs, which are coordinated and administered by state-
level environmental agencies such as the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency 
(IEPA), work within the framework of CERCLA, as well as supplement this federal 
legislation.  Common features of state brownfields legislation include a voluntary, 
streamlined permitting and remediation process with risk-based cleanup standards and 
state oversight, a requirement for some level of public participation in the process, and 
technical and financial incentives to proceed with redevelopment.9  While the core of the 
legislation surrounding brownfields is at the federal or state level, it is largely up to 
private developers or municipalities to take advantage of the programs and incentives 
created by this legislation.  Within this public-private scheme, local governments and 
community organizations must play a key role in redevelopment projects that the private 
sector alone would not pursue because of the questionable return on their investment.10 
¶3 The City of Chicago has taken an active role in such redevelopment projects by 
creating its own Chicago Brownfields Initiative.  The Chicago Brownfields Initiative was 
established in 1993 and is based on the premise that in many cases, public resources are 
necessary to return brownfield sites to productive use.11  Through a process of acquiring, 
cleaning, and coordinating the redevelopment of brownfields, Chicago claims to have 
succeeded in reversing the urban blight associated with brownfields by transforming 
them into industrial facilities, green space, affordable housing, and technical and 
manufacturing centers in some of the City’s most challenging areas and economically 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.12 
¶4 Chicago’s Brownfields Initiative (the “Initiative”) has completed or is in the process 
of completing over 40 site-remediation and redevelopment projects, and the general 
consensus appears to be that the Initiative has successfully spurred redevelopment and 
reuse of sites that otherwise would have sat vacant and unproductive.13  An examination 
                                                                                                                                                 
Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 894-95 (1996). 
8 Id. at 987-88. 
9 Id. at 915-21. 
10 Illinois Brownfields Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions, Bureau of Land, 
http://www.epa.state.il.us/land/brownfields/faq.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) (stating that unlike private 
businesses, local governments are responsible for promoting the health and well being of their 
communities, and they play a key role in redevelopment projects that the private sector would not 
undertake on its own). 
11 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, http://egov.cityofchicago.org (follow “City Departments” hyperlink, then 
follow “Environment” hyperlink, then follow “Brownfields Initiative” hyperlink, then follow “Success 
Stories” hyperlink, then follow “Chicago Brownfields Initiative: Recycling Our Past, Investing in Our 
Future” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 6, 2008); see also About the Brownfields Initiative, 
http://egov.cityofchicago.org (follow “City Departments” hyperlink, then follow “Environment” hyperlink, 
then follow “Initiatives & Programs” hyperlink, then follow “Brownfields Initiative” hyperlink) (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
12 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 1. 
13 Telephone Interviews with Mike Charles, Brownfields Coordinator, Illinois Environmental Protection 
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of the program’s results indicates that Chicago’s Brownfields Initiative has created and 
retained jobs, objectively increased the quality of life in surrounding communities, 
provided housing stock, prompted some additional investment, increased nearby property 
values, improved environmental health and safety, and provided valuable services to 
communities. 
¶5 However, enthusiasm regarding these successes must be tempered by a series of 
more critical questions.  Do the jobs, services, and amenities created at brownfield sites 
actually benefit the communities in which they are placed?  Is redevelopment causing 
gentrification and pushing out the original community?  Is the community’s reaction even 
being measured?  Are the technical and institutional controls put in place to protect 
environmental and human health sufficient?  Do lowered cleanup standards lock sites into 
one type of use that may not always serve the needs of the community?  In sum, has the 
Chicago Brownfields Initiative made the leap from redevelopment to actually alleviating 
economic and social problems? 
¶6 This Comment seeks to examine whether and why (or why not) Chicago has 
succeeded in its goal of improving the City’s environmental and economic health and 
thereby positively affecting the communities in which brownfield redevelopment has 
occurred.  It begins with a description of federal, state, and local brownfields programs 
and then moves on to explore the many successes and the potential downfalls of 
Chicago’s Brownfields Initiative, the reasons behind them, and the opportunities for 
improvement of the program. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF BROWNFIELDS 
A. The Unintended Consequences of CERCLA 
¶7 Congress enacted CERCLA on December 11, 1980 with the dual intentions of 
cleaning the environmental contamination caused by hundreds of years of hazardous 
waste pollution and preventing future contamination.14  While it has been altered and 
amended numerous times, CERCLA’s basic structure remains largely intact today and 
can be described as a combination of four basic sections.  First, CERCLA provides for a 
federal right to gather information on the environmental status of land or entities as well 
as outlines a procedure for gathering such information.15  Second, CERCLA grants 
governmental authority to clean up hazardous contamination.16  Third, it establishes a 
funding mechanism to pay for such government cleanups, dubbed the Superfund,17 and 
fourth, it sets up a liability scheme to hold parties associated with contaminated land 
responsible for the costs of cleanup.18  Unfortunately, despite the good intentions and 
extensive planning behind CERCLA, over the course of the next decade it became 
apparent that the structure of this groundbreaking piece of environmental legislation 
resulted in a second set of social and environmental problems across the country.19 
                                                                                                                                                 
Agency (Oct. 3, 2006), Dave Graham, Environmental Engineer, City of Chicago Department of the 
Environment (Oct. 11, 2006), Keith Harley, Director, Chicago Environmental Law Clinic (Sept. 27, 2006), 
and James Van der Kloot, Region V Brownfields Coordinator, U.S. EPA (Oct. 10, 2006). 
14 Shapiro, supra note 3, at 441. 
15 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 3. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Shapiro, supra note 3, at 443. 
19 Id. 
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¶8 The section of CERCLA that has proved the most controversial is its broad liability 
scheme.20  Under CERCLA, the federal government has the authority to (1) sue 
potentially responsible parties upon discovery of contamination and force them to clean 
or pay for the cleanup, or (2) remediate a property and then sue potentially responsible 
parties for reimbursement of the cleanup costs.21  The potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs) under the CERCLA liability scheme include (1) owners of the land at the time the 
contamination occurred, (2) operators of the contaminating facility, (3) generators of the 
waste that caused the contamination, (4) parties that arranged for the contaminant’s 
disposal at or transport to the land, and (5) current owners of the land and operators of 
facilities thereon.22  CERCLA’s liability is joint and several and traditional causation 
requirements are relaxed so that each of these PRPs, regardless of whether they actually 
caused the contamination, can be held liable for the entire cost of cleanup at a CERCLA 
site.23  These cleanup expenses can be immense.  The remediation of properties 
contaminated with hazardous waste is complex and costly, and the cost of the cleanup is 
often more than the value of the land.24 
¶9 CERCLA’s broad definition of PRPs and strict cleanup standards, combined with 
the high cost of remediation, substantially deterred the development of any land that even 
seemed as though it might harbor some form of contamination.25  Current owners of such 
properties are often either unable to afford the environmental cleanup or concerned that 
even if they undertake some remediation, they may still be liable for additional claims by 
the U.S. EPA because an owner-initiated cleanup of a site does not guarantee freedom 
from government action with respect to the site.  The owner-initiated cleanup must meet 
the strict standards for CERCLA remediation, and if it does not, additional cleanup may 
be required.26  Consequently, owners may fear that undertaking a cleanup will draw 
attention to a site and result in an extended and expensive remediation process beyond 
what they initially planned.  Further, potential purchasers and developers fear that if they 
acquire property and later discover the land is contaminated, they will assume all of the 
responsibility for cleaning the pre-existing contamination.27  There is also a well-founded 
fear of liability on the part of lenders that prevents the extension of loans on such 
properties.28  Thus, CERCLA had the unfortunate consequence of actually discouraging 
cleanup and redevelopment of many potentially contaminated properties, causing owners 
to “virtually abandon” these properties, leaving them dormant and unproductive.29 
¶10 These mothballed sites are termed “brownfields” and are defined by the U.S. EPA 
as “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated 
by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant or 
contaminant.”30  The sites are, most commonly, abandoned industrial facilities, 
                                                 
20 Id. at 445. 
21 Id. at 444. 
22 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 224-26. 
23 Id. 
24 Shapiro, supra note 3, at 446. 
25 Eisen, supra note 7, at 899. 
26 Shapiro, supra note 3, at 446. 
27 Eisen, supra note 7, at 901. 
28 Id. at 911 (stating that recent cases have found that “sufficiently involved” lenders may be liable for 
CERCLA cleanup costs). 
29 Shapiro, supra note 3, at 447. 
30 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2000). 
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warehouses, and other commercial properties such as former gas stations and dry 
cleaners.31  Brownfields tend to be concentrated in older, predominantly minority and 
low-income neighborhoods from which manufacturers and businesses have fled and in 
which market forces will not prompt redevelopment.32  Such neighborhoods are faced 
with numerous social and economic issues, and empty and unproductive brownfields 
carry with them a host of problems that contribute to an overall condition typically 
described as blight.33 
¶11 The list of ways in which brownfields harm a neighborhood is extensive.  The 
depressed marketability of the real estate discourages redevelopment that would provide 
jobs and services for area residents.34  The sites are potential sources of health problems 
and drinking water contamination.35  The vacant properties are breeding grounds for 
crime, venues for drug use, and sites for illegal dumping.36  Cities are deprived of the 
property tax revenues that productive use of the land would provide, lessening the pool of 
funds available to provide services and education to citizens.37  The sites are unattractive, 
discourage investment in surrounding properties, and contribute to an insidious bleakness 
in the neighborhood.38  While many of these costs are not easily quantified, they are real, 
and they are potentially quite large.39 
B. Responses to the Brownfields Problem 
¶12 In order to address this costly unintended consequence of CERCLA, both the 
federal government and the states have enacted legislation to encourage the remediation 
and redevelopment of brownfields.40  At the federal level, Congress amended CERCLA 
in 2002 to extend protections from liability to prospective purchasers of certain sites, to 
relieve some small business owners from CERCLA liability, and to increase funding for 
state and local programs for the assessment and remediation of brownfields.41  
Additionally, the U.S. EPA now enters into agreements with states to ensure that they 
                                                 
31 NAT’L ENVTL. POLICY INST., BEYOND BROWNFIELDS: IDLE LAND, SUBURBAN SPRAWL, AND THE LAW 6 
(1995). 
32 Eisen, supra note 7, at 910-15.  There are fewer brownfields in “better” areas of cities because (1) 
businesses tend not to leave such areas in the first place, and (2) it is often worth a developer’s effort to 
undertake a cleanup and redevelopment in an area of the city that will eventually yield a return on his or her 
investment. 
33 Christopher De Sousa, Residential Development Activity on Urban Brownfields in Milwaukee and 
Chicago: An Examination of Redevelopment Trends, Developer Perceptions, and Future Projects 8 (2006) 
(working paper, Dep’t of Geography, Brownfields Research Consortium, Ctr. for Econ. Dev., Univ. Wis.-
Milwaukee).  Though the concept of blight does not have a single, universally-accepted definition; high 
crime rates, turnover in residency and commercial occupancy, drug trafficking, and overall unkempt 
buildings are often the characteristics associated with blighted areas.  Sarah Sparks, Note, Deteriorated vs. 
Deteriorating: The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine and Blight Takings Norwood v. Horney, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1769, 1788 (2007). 
34 Eisen, supra note 7, at 910-15. 
35 Eisen, supra note 7, at 895 n.41 (citing CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, NORTHEAST-
MIDWEST, INST., COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 (1996)). 
36 Eisen, supra note 7, at 895. 
37 Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality 
in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 717 (1994). 
38 Eisen, supra note 7, at 894-95. 
39 Id. at 894. 
40 Id. at 914-15. 
41 Green, supra note 4, at 579. 
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will not pursue CERCLA cleanup actions on properties remediated under state voluntary 
cleanup programs.42  The states, in turn, have passed their own legislation to attract 
developers to brownfields and to take advantage of federal incentives for brownfield 
redevelopment.43  Most state programs have a common set of components.  States attempt 
to avoid the excessive costs and delays associated with brownfield redevelopment by 
streamlining and making more flexible the permitting and remediation process.44  The 
programs often provide incentives to voluntarily assess and clean contaminated sites and 
give guarantees of liability protection once cleanup is completed.45  The stated purpose of 
both state and federal brownfields legislation is to encourage environmental and 
economic improvement in order to alleviate the negative effects of brownfields.46  There 
is fairly widespread consensus that the legislation is capable of achieving this goal if 
effectively implemented.47 
¶13 Illinois’s brownfields program, created in 1995, includes versions of each of the 
typical components of state brownfields programs.48  The core of the Illinois brownfields 
scheme is the voluntary Site Remediation Program (SRP).  Parties enter the program by 
allowing their site to be evaluated by the IEPA and preparing a site remediation plan to 
be approved by the IEPA.49  Upon approval of a site remediation plan, the site qualifies 
for a variety of financial assistance programs, including grants, loans, and tax credits, to 
cover the costs of assessment and remediation.50  Sites in the voluntary SRP are then 
remediated under the Tiered Approach to Corrective Action (TACO) which allows sites 
to be cleaned to differing degrees depending upon the intended future use.51  Once the 
cleanup is completed, the IEPA issues a No Further Remediation letter (NFR letter) for 
the property, which releases the program participant from future liability and contains the 
                                                 
42 Eisen, supra note 7, at 987. 
43 Green, supra note 4, at 581. 
44 Id. at 580-81. 
45 Id. 
46 See U.S. EPA, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment: About Brownfields (2006), 
http://epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) (noting that the EPA’s Brownfields 
Program is designed to empower states, communities, and other stakeholders in economic redevelopment to 
work together in a timely manner to safely clean and sustainably reuse brownfields); see also Georgette C. 
Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft 
Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 51 (1995) (commenting that according to the EPA, the purpose of 
the brownfields program is to provide a common sense way to redevelop contaminated land, create jobs, 
and stimulate economic development through environmental cleanup); Illinois Brownfields Initiative, 
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10 (explaining that the problems that the Illinois Brownfields 
Initiative is intended to address include potential harm to human health and the environment, reduced local 
employment opportunities and tax revenue, limited economic growth and development, vandalism, 
dumping and other illegal activity, lowering of surrounding property values, neighborhood deterioration, 
and urban sprawl); see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text for a list of the negative effects of 
brownfields. 
47 Jennifer Felten, Brownfield Redevelopment 1995-2005: An Environmental Justice Success Story?, 40 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 679, 695 (2006); see also Telephone Interviews with Keith Harley, Mike 
Charles, & Dave Graham, supra note 13. 
48 CHARLES BARTSCH & RACHEL DEANE, NORTHEAST-MIDWEST INSTITUTE, BROWNFIELDS “STATE OF THE 
STATES”: AN END-OF-SESSION REVIEW OF INITIATIVES AND PROGRAM IMPACTS IN THE 50 STATES 31-32 
(2001). 
49 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 11; see also Telephone Interview with Mike Charles, supra note 13 (noting 
that the IEPA provides extensive guidance and technical assistance to participants during the SRP process). 
50 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 11. 
51 About the Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11; Illinois Brownfields Initiative, Frequently Asked 
Questions, supra note 10. 
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terms and conditions for the future use of the property.52  Illinois is able to provide such 
protection from CERCLA liability because the state has entered into the Superfund 
Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. EPA stating that the U.S. EPA will not 
generally pursue legal action with respect to sites cleaned voluntarily under the Illinois 
SRP.53 
C. The Implementation of Brownfields Legislation 
¶14 All of the state and federal legislation discussed thus far provides only a framework 
for the redevelopment of brownfields.  These legislative programs provide options and 
incentives that other entities—usually private redevelopers, community groups, non-
profits, or municipalities—may use in order to proceed with actual site redevelopment.  
In fact, because most states have very similar brownfields legislation and programs, 
disparities in results are often due to differences in how the state and federal schemes are 
utilized by developers and other participants in the programs.54 
¶15 State and federal brownfields programs enabled many of the more favorably located 
brownfields to be developed by private for-profit developers.55  At these sites, developers 
are confident that even with the slightly higher than average transactional costs associated 
with brownfields redevelopment, they will get an adequate return on their investment.56  
However, there are other brownfields that the free market-oriented private sector is less 
likely to remediate.  Badly contaminated sites and sites in economically depressed areas 
fall into this category.57  Often, it is up to local governments to promote and play a key 
role in these brownfields redevelopment projects.58 
III. THE CITY OF CHICAGO AND BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT 
¶16 The City of Chicago has taken on a number of these less desirable brownfields and 
returned them to productive use by taking advantage of state and federal incentives and 
using City and private resources to facilitate redevelopment.59  These redevelopment 
projects are coordinated by the City under the Chicago Brownfields Initiative.  The 
Initiative was established in 1993 and is the combined effort of the Department of the 
Environment, the Mayor’s Office, the Department of Planning and Development, the 
Department of Buildings, and the Department of Law.60  City employees in both the 
Department of the Environment and the Department of Planning and Development are 
dedicated exclusively to the Brownfields Initiative and its execution.61  The stated 
purpose of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative is two-fold: (1) to link environmental 
restoration with economic development by cleaning and redeveloping brownfields, and 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Sarah W. Rubenstein, CERCLA’s Contribution to the Federal Brownfields Problem: A Proposal for 
Federal Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 149, 164 (1996-1997). 
55 Telephone Interview with Mike Charles, supra note 13. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Illinois Brownfields Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10 (indicating that municipalities, 
unlike private actors, have an obligation to promote and protect the health and well-being of their 
communities). 
59 Telephone Interviews with Mike Charles, Dave Graham & Keith Harley, supra note 13. 
60 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 1. 
61 Telephone Interview with Dave Graham, supra note 13. 
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(2) to improve policies that promote private redevelopment of brownfields in order to 
create jobs and generate tax revenue.62  Since its establishment, the Initiative has 
broadened its purview to include the creation of open spaces, housing, parking, and office 
spaces.63  Chicago was considered one of the forerunners in the municipal brownfields 
movement,64 and its efforts have been duplicated in a number of cities nationwide.65 
¶17 The remainder of this Comment provides an account of the policies and procedures 
the City of Chicago has used in its Brownfields Initiative and examines whether Chicago 
has succeeded in its goal of economic and environmental improvement to the benefit of 
the surrounding communities. 
A. The Chicago Brownfields Initiative: The Program and the Process 
¶18 The Chicago Brownfields Initiative is based on the premise that in many cases, 
public resources are necessary to overcome the barriers to brownfield redevelopment and 
return sites to productive uses.66  In order to do so, the City designed a program to select, 
acquire, redevelop, and market brownfields across Chicago.  The City focuses on sites 
with the best combination of environmental factors and redevelopment potential.67  Site 
selection is thus based largely on two factors: (1) whether the contamination at the site is 
limited enough that it is economically feasible to remediate, and (2) whether the site has 
industrial, commercial or residential potential.68  The first factor is usually evaluated via a 
preliminary assessment by the Chicago Department of the Environment and the second 
factor is evaluated by the Department of Planning and Development.69  Once a site is 
selected, the City acquires the site through a negotiated purchase, lien foreclosure, or tax 
reactivation on the property.70  The City then conducts a more detailed risk assessment to 
determine the environmental state of the acquired property and the site is enlisted in the 
IEPA’s voluntary SRP.71  The IEPA designates cleanup standards for the site using the 
TACO approach72 and the site is then remediated to those specifications—hazardous 
materials at the site are either removed or dealt with via institutional and technical 
controls.73  Upon completion of the cleanup, an NFR letter is issued for the site.74 
                                                 
62 About the Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11. 
63 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 1. 
64 Id. at 3 (noting that Chicago participated in the EPA Regional Brownfields Pilot Program and was named 
an EPA Showcase Community); see also EPA Brownfields Assessment Pilot Fact Sheet, Chicago, IL, 
(2006), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/chicago.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) (the City 
organized the Chicago Brownfields Forum in 1994, which was a meeting of 130 real estate developers, 
industrialists, bankers, lawyers, representatives from local, state and federal government agencies, 
environmental advocates, and community groups.  Over the course of six months, the group developed a set 
of sixty-five recommendations for promoting brownfields redevelopment on a number of different levels.). 
65 Telephone Interviews with Mike Charles, Dave Graham & Keith Harley, supra note 13. 
66 About the Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11. 
67 Id. 
68 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 4. 
69 Telephone Interview with Dave Graham, supra note 13. 
70 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 4. 
71 Id. 
72 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
73 Id.  Institutional controls define and limit the future uses of a site so that remaining contamination will 
not become a danger to human health. Technical controls are physical barriers, such as caps and covers, 
which allow some contamination to remain at the site as long as it is properly contained. 
74 Id. 
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¶19 Concurrent with the site selection, acquisition, and remediation process described 
above, the City works to construct a future plan for the site.  This includes finding an 
interested developer or group of developers, identifying and coordinating a coalition of 
stakeholders, creating incentives and acquiring funding to make the redevelopment 
possible, and locating additional investors when necessary.75  The construction of a 
redevelopment plan varies greatly from site to site.  Funding mechanisms include federal 
and state brownfields grants, U.S. Housing and Urban Development loans, Section 108 
funds, Tax Increment Funds (TIFs),76 and City-issued bonds.77  Developers and 
stakeholders consist of local companies, entrepreneurs, not-for-profit organizations, 
community groups, and large corporations.78  Sites range in size from single lots to 
thousands of acres, and past uses range from rock crushing facilities to the location of the 
1968 Democratic Convention.79  Future uses include large factories, community centers, 
affordable and market rate housing, green spaces, parks, and job training facilities.80  In 
light of this great variation, each brownfield redevelopment site is its own unique project, 
and the City plays an integral role in the cleanup and development processes at each 
Chicago Brownfields Initiative site.  At these City-initiated projects, the City ultimately 
decides what comes out and what goes into a former brownfield site. 
B. The Results 
¶20 Since its establishment, the Chicago Brownfields Initiative has facilitated the 
redevelopment of over 13,000 acres of land at over 40 sites across the City.81  At each of 
these locations, the City has effectively remediated and redeveloped vacant sites into 
industrial, commercial, and residential properties.82  Redevelopment, however, is not 
done for its own sake—the ultimate goal of brownfields legislation and programs at every 
level is to improve environmental and economic conditions.83  Each redeveloped 
brownfield should benefit the surrounding area and community by reducing 
environmental and health burdens, increasing economic opportunity, and encouraging 
neighborhood revitalization.84 
                                                 
75 NORMAN WALZER, ET AL., BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP AND REUSE IN ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES 90-95 
(2004). 
76 Section 108 provides federally guaranteed loans for large economic development projects, public 
infrastructure, and housing, which may be used for site acquisition, infrastructure, site clearance and 
improvements, economic development activities, housing construction, and finance-related activities.  
Julianne Kurdila & Elise Rindfleisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfield Redevelopment, 34 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 485 (2007).  Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is a method of facilitating 
development or redevelopment of a certain area by utilizing future property tax revenues—realized from 
taxes generated only from the TIF District—to pay for necessary public improvements.  In the case of 
brownfield redevelopment, the tax revenues are usually applied to the cost of cleanup at the site.  De Sousa, 
supra note 33, at 26, 34-35. 
77 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 11. 
78 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 2. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Telephone Interview with Dave Graham, supra note 13. 
82 WALZER ET AL., supra note 75, at 87-88. 
83 See supra note 46. 
84 Espinosa, supra note 1, at 4; see also Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis, Defining the Brownfields 
Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 11 
(1997) (emphasizing that remediation of brownfields must preserve and enhance the community’s health, 
safety and environment), and NAT’L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL WASTE & FACILITY SITING 
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1. First, the Successes 
¶21 The literature on brownfields redevelopment uses a number of measures to judge 
the success of a project or program.  Though the potential rubrics are many, they can be 
distilled into a few basic measures which can be evaluated on a project by project basis: 
job creation and retention, housing development, improvements to quality of life/services 
and amenities provided to the community, encouragement of additional investment in the 
area, improvement in the environmental health and safety of the community, and benefits 
to local government due to increased tax revenues.85  Chicago has achieved success in 
each of these areas. 
i) Job Creation and Retention 
¶22 The original focus of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative was industrial and 
economic redevelopment with the purpose of job creation, and the City actively recruited 
employers and manufacturers to occupy former brownfields.86  While numbers vary 
greatly from project to project, brownfields in the Chicago area have created an average 
of 77 jobs and retained an average of 68 jobs per project, 76.2% of which reported higher 
wages than were paid under previous uses of the land.87 
¶23 Numerous examples demonstrate the success of the Initiative in this arena.  At 445 
North Sacramento Avenue, the City coordinated the transformation of the former 
Sacramento Crushing Company, which had deteriorated into a pile of debris, into the 
Chicago Center for Green Technology.88  The Center created 38 jobs, and the 
redevelopment also saved 450 jobs at a neighboring company that was planning to leave 
Chicago.89  The former International Amphitheater is now home to a new Aramark 
manufacturing and warehouse facility, which will retain 217 jobs and create an additional 
90 jobs at the site.90  An abandoned parcel at 927 South California Avenue—a site that 
was targeted for redevelopment by the Initiative due to the high surrounding 
unemployment rate and consequential available labor force91—became the California 
Avenue Business Park, creating between 400 and 600 new jobs.92  The list goes on—200 
jobs created at the Gateway Park Industrial Complex,93 2000 jobs created and 2500 
retained at ATA’s Chicago Airline Training Center on South Cicero,94 550 jobs created 
and 450 retained at a new Solo manufacturing and distribution facility at 3333 East 87th 
                                                                                                                                                 
SUBCOMM., U.S. EPA, No. EPA 500-R-96-002, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION, AND 
BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE 7-8 (1996), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/public_dialogue_brownfields_1296.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2008) (stating that economic development at brownfields must directly benefit members of 
the community). 
85 WALZER ET AL., supra note 75, at 12-14. 
86 About the Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 2. 
87 WALZER ET AL., supra note 75, at 51-52 (these numbers are based on a sampling of sites as reported by 
the City of Chicago). 
88 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 6. 
89 Id. at 7. 
90 Id. at 22. 
91 WALZER ET AL., supra note 75, at 96. 
92 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 5. 
93 Id. at 9. 
94 Id. at 10. 
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Street,95 125 jobs created and 500 retained at the Vernon Steel Site,96 100 jobs created and 
200 retained at the Blackstone Manufacturing site,97 14 jobs created and 150 retained at 
the Chicago Turnrite site,98 7 jobs created and 150 retained at the Chicago Dryer site,99 
and more.  Even factoring in normal economic growth, the sheer number of jobs created 
by the Chicago Brownfields Initiative is impressive. 
ii) Residential Redevelopment 
¶24 While brownfields redevelopment, across the country and in Chicago, initially 
focused on industrial projects, attention is now being paid to residential development on 
these sites.100  As of 2003, 25 publicly assisted residential brownfields projects had been 
undertaken in Chicago.101  These 25 projects produced a total of 4,853 units, around 2,000 
of which were designated to be affordable.102  The City provided funding, Tax Increment 
Financing, reductions in land sale prices, assistance with cleanup costs, and substantial 
guidance to its residential brownfields projects.103  The result has been both developer and 
consumer interest in the projects and the products.104  Perhaps more importantly, 
Chicago’s brownfield redevelopment has gone beyond “cherry picking” the best 
properties in the best locales.105  City government has successfully promoted development 
in areas where few developers would have otherwise ventured.106  Chicago’s programs 
and incentives have also succeeded in causing developers to incorporate affordable units 
into new housing, even in higher-end projects.107 
¶25 Again, examples illustrate the City’s success.  At Columbia Pointe, located at 63rd 
and Woodlawn streets, 51 new homes replaced a vacant and abandoned commercial strip, 
and the addition of up to 209 more homes is under consideration.108  Twenty percent of 
                                                 
95 Id. at 13. 
96 U.S. EPA, NO. EPA 500-F-98-254, BROWNFIELDS SHOWCASE COMMUNITY: CHICAGO, IL 2 (1998), 




100 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 6.  While residential reuse of brownfields has been commonplace in Europe 
and Canada, the United States has been slower to warm to the idea, focusing instead on the direct monetary 
benefits of industrial and commercial use.  However, there has been growing recognition among 
stakeholders and actors in the United States that the residential redevelopment of brownfields holds 
enormous potential for increasing the availability of housing in cities, improving the economic and social 
well-being of inner city neighborhoods by eliminating blight, strengthening community pride, enhancing 
local tax bases, raising property values, and maximizing the efficient use of services.  See also Chicago 
Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 2.  The Initiative originally focused on industrial and economic 
redevelopment, job creation, and tax revenues, but the vision expanded to include the creation of green 
spaces, affordable housing, and office space. 
101 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 27.  Note that not all publicly assisted projects are necessarily part of the 
Chicago Brownfields Initiative. 
102 Id. at 31 (defining affordable as priced for buyers who make 80-120% of the median income of the 
metro area). 
103 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 24; see also De Sousa, supra note 33, at 42 (noting 
that these same mechanisms were identified by developers as effective ways for a city to encourage 
residential redevelopment). 
104 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 43. 
105 Id. at 43-44. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 45. 
108 Id. at 61. 
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these homes are designated to be affordable.109  In Bronzeville, at 705 East 40th Street, 33 
new homes were constructed, 16 of which are now occupied by residents who had 
previously moved from the neighborhood due to its deterioration and lack of housing 
stock.110  A large project called University Village near University of Illinois at Chicago’s 
South Campus resulted in 930 new residential units.111  Here, the City arranged for TIF 
districting on the condition that 21% of the new units be affordable.112  North Town 
Village, built on seven acres near the former Cabrini Green housing projects, provided 
261 units on a former commercial and gas station site.113  Consisting of seven-story mid-
rises and flats, 30% of the units are market-rate for-sale units, 20% are affordable units, 
and 30% are subsidized public housing.114 
iii) Improvements to Quality of Life, Services & Amenities Provided  
¶26 The City of Chicago seems to have recognized the importance of improving the 
quality of life in the areas surrounding brownfields and has responded by incorporating 
service-providers, amenities, and open spaces into many Chicago Brownfields Initiative 
projects.  By providing such useful services and recreational facilities while at the same 
time eliminating vacant lots that harbor criminal activity, the Chicago Brownfields 
Initiative has contributed to improved quality of life near redeveloped sites. 
¶27 At 3333 East 87th Street, the site of the new Solo factory, the City created two TIF 
districts—one for Solo and one for “the betterment of the surrounding neighborhood.”115  
The Chicago Park District worked with the Department of Planning and Development to 
create a lakefront park at the site.  The roads to and from the park were revamped into 
boulevard-style roadways to improve community access and aesthetics.116  The 
development of the Columbia Pointe Homes was similarly beneficial to the area.  The 
new affordable housing provided a basic necessity for the community, and the 
development was accompanied by bike trails, new lighting in alleys, and neighborhood 
fruit and vegetable gardens.117  At the 76th and Parnell Street residential redevelopment, 
the north portion of the site was reserved for green space and a community center was 
built to provide after-school programming, education, and family-oriented activities.118  
The California Avenue Business Park includes a job training facility and prompted the 
expansion of local transportation facilities.119 
¶28 In North Lawndale, the Lawndale Christian Development Corporation (LCDC), a 
community organization focused on economic development, crafted plans for a much-
needed childcare center in the mid-1990’s after a series of community meetings about 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 21. 
111 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 66.  Note that University Village was not an actual Chicago Brownfields 
Initiative project; rather, it was initiated by private developers who then worked with the City to acquire 
financial and techincal assitance and complete the redevelopment. 
112 Id. at 67-68. 
113 WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 99-100. 
114 Id. 
115 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 14. 
116 Id. 
117 WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 64. 
118 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 20. 
119 WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 96. 
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how to improve the community through the development of a vacant lot.120  However, the 
group was deterred from building at that time by the presumption of contamination on the 
land.121  The LCDC eventually teamed with two other non-profits and approached the 
City.122  The City agreed to acquire the LCDC site along with several adjacent parcels, 
clean the site, and then transfer it back to the LCDC for $1. The result was the Jubilee 
Family Resource Center and the Carole Robertson Center for Learning, a 20,000 square 
foot childcare center with Head Start and Youth Alternatives programs.  The North 
Lawndale community had voiced a strong desire for daycare facilities, and the provision 
of this much-needed service was well-received by local residents.123 
¶29 In addition to providing services and amenities, brownfield redevelopment also 
improves the quality of life in a neighborhood by reducing the incidence of detrimental 
activities in the area.  Redevelopments have been linked to a decrease in criminal 
behavior.  Vacant lots and abandoned buildings provide out-of-sight venues for drug use, 
dealing, and other criminal activity.124  Such sites also invite illegal dumping that deepens 
the risk to human and environmental health in the area.125  By eliminating these vacant 
lots and structures, these illicit activities are pushed out as well. 
iv) Encouragement of Additional Investment 
¶30 Brownfields legislation and programs are no longer just about remediation and 
reuse, but rather function as a means to increase the economic viability of an area.126  One 
new building does not an economic turnaround make, so to be deemed successful a 
brownfield redevelopment must bring with it additional investment, businesses, and 
development.127  Many of Chicago’s brownfields projects are credited as the source of 
additional investment in the area.  The ATA Airline Training Center came hand in hand 
with the modernization of Midway Airport.128  A company near the Chicago Center for 
Green Technology changed its plans to leave the community.129  On West Adams Street, 
                                                 
120 Felten, supra note 47, at 688. 
121 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 16. 
122 Id. 
123 Felten, supra note 47, at 688. 
124 Telephone Interview with James Van der Kloot, supra note 13 (detailing his recent visit to a Chicago 
Brownfields Initiative site on Roosevelt Avenue that was formerly abandoned and frequented by drug 
addicts, dealers, and prostitutes, and is now being sold as new commercial space into which a number of 
businesses have already moved); see also Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 5, 11 (stating 
that the California Avenue Business Park replaced thirty-seven acres of land “blighted by waste and illicit 
behavior”).  
125 Telephone Interview with James Van der Kloot, supra note 13 (The interviewee recounted that since 
being partially destroyed in a fire during the 1980’s, the former Burnside Steel site had been scavenged to 
the point of collapse, has housed various types of illegal activity, and is piled waist high with illegally 
dumped materials.  The site is now occupied by an expansion of the Verson Corporation stamping 
operations and other private businesses.); see also Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 5, 11 
(stating that illegal waste dumping had become a problem at 2242 South Grove Street, now the site of the 
International Union of Operating Engineers Local 399); WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 99 (Gateway 
Park at 76th and Albany Streets had become known as the largest illegal dumpsite in the state.). 
126 Green, supra note 4, at 571. 
127 Id. at 573-74 (Green notes that inner city neighborhoods present development challenges not only 
because of potential environmental issues, but also due to overall economic conditions, household income, 
and general blight.  These areas thus suffer from deteriorated infrastructure, patterns of disinvestment, 
abandonment, and lack of basic services such as grocery stores and retail outlets.). 
128 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 10. 
129 Id. at 7. 
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the Scott Petersen Sausage Plant, located across the street from a City-initiated 
brownfield development, added a new smokehouse and hired locals to fill 100 new 
positions in the plant.130  The California Avenue Business Park is expected to encourage 
neighboring businesses to replace decaying and obsolete facilities, expand current 
operations, and add complementary uses or office space.131  The Columbia Pointe 
residential redevelopment is not only spurring additional rehabilitation and rebuilding by 
private residential developers, but is part of a larger plan to bring in retail, business, and 
recreational opportunities.132 In many cases, it is difficult to directly attribute additional 
investment in an area to a brownfield redevelopment.133  However, the benefits that 
accompany brownfield redevelopment—such as increased population due to new housing 
stock, city investment in infrastructure, and improved aesthetics—all seem likely to 
encourage additional investment, and the instances above demonstrate that this is 
occurring in Chicago. 
v) Benefits to Local Government Due to Increased Tax Revenues 
¶31 The success of a brownfield redevelopment can be measured in part by the 
attendant increase in tax revenues.134  The City identified this as a major focus of the 
Initiative in its original brownfields plan.135  The California Avenue Business Park has 
been the headliner in this arena, generating estimated annual tax revenues of $2.3 
million.136  While exact numbers are not available for the other sites undertaken by the 
Initiative, it is reasonable to assume that the transformation from abandoned and vacant 
property to productive use has substantially increased the City’s tax revenues. 
vi) Environmental Health and Safety  
¶32 One of the goals of the Brownfields Initiative, and of all brownfields programs and 
legislation, 137 is to improve environmental health.138  The degree of both contamination 
and cleanup varies substantially from site to site within the City, so Chicago conducts 
site-specific assessment and remediation planning.  This allows for cleanup to be 
matched to the current contamination and to the future use of the site. 
¶33 At the California Business Park site, 964 tons of lead and chromium contaminated 
soil and eleven underground storage tanks were removed and backfilled with crushed 
stone.139  At the Gateway Park site, 600,000 cubic yards of concrete, asphalt, construction 
                                                 
130 Telephone Interview with James Van der Kloot, supra note 13. 
131 WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 97. 
132 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 64. 
133 NORMAN WALZER & GISELE F. HAMM, RETURNS TO BROWNFIELDS INVESTMENTS (Illinois Institute for 
Rural Affairs, Western Ill. Univ. ed. 2004) (The authors conclude that measuring the overall impact of 
brownfield redevelopment is difficult given the available information on employment, payrolls and private 
investment.  The effects extend well beyond the immediate brownfield site, and thus are hard to capture.  In 
addition, there is no central place in the City that collects comprehensive data on such investment.). 
134 David A. Dana, State Brownfield Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 
99 (2005). 
135 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 2 (stating that the Brownfields Initiative originally 
focused on industrial and economic redevelopment, job creation, and tax revenues). 
136 Id. 
137 See supra note 46. 
138 About the Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11. 
139 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 5. 
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debris, rubbish, and hazardous automobile shredder residue were removed.140  The 
International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE) site was freed of 2,990 tons of 
radioactive and contaminated soil as well as a number of underground storage tanks.141  
The new Solo site was remediated to residential standards, returning the site to its pre-
industrial condition.142  At the West Pullman site, several thousand tons of contaminated 
soil was remediated on-site and deteriorating structures were demolished and removed.143  
In North Lawndale, two underground storage tanks were excavated and 3,700 tons of 
contaminated soil was removed to prevent ground water contamination.144  The list 
continues in a similar manner—each site’s environmental condition was improved by the 
Chicago Brownfields program.  The Initiative facilitated the removal of thousands of tons 
of contaminated soil, hundreds of piles of potentially hazardous debris, and tens of 
leaking underground storage tanks.145 
2. Next, the Concerns 
¶34 It is apparent that Chicago’s Brownfields Initiative has been largely successful by 
conventional measures.  These successes, however, are not unqualified.  The program 
must be evaluated to address a number of concerns that are often at issue in brownfield 
redevelopment and that Chicago may not have entirely escaped.  This section addresses 
some of these issues and suggests how the City might alter its program to avoid these 
potential pitfalls. 
i) Do the Jobs Generated Benefit Members of the Community? 
¶35 Since the goals of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative include both job creation146 
and community revitalization,147 it logically follows that brownfield redevelopment 
should reduce the high unemployment that plagues many of the inner city neighborhoods 
in which the redevelopment occurs.148  Chicago has made an effort to do so in many of its 
brownfield projects.  Because many of the sites became home to industrial facilities, most 
of the jobs created are likely to be accessible to the less educated workforce that resides 
near brownfields.  Furthermore, a number of the Chicago brownfield redevelopment 
projects incorporated job training programs aimed at bringing local residents up to speed 
with the skills needed to fill the jobs created by redevelopment.149 
                                                 
140 Id. at 9. 
141 Id. at 11. 
142 Id. at 13. 
143 Id. at 15. 
144 Id. at 16. 
145 Id. 
146 About the Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11 (stating that “the purpose of the Chicago Brownfields 
Initiative is to create jobs”). 
147 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 2 (claiming that the City of Chicago has created the 
most aggressive program in the nation to reverse the urban blight associated with brownfields and open 
new horizons for distressed communities). 
148 BROWNFIELDS SHOWCASE COMMUNITY, supra note 96 (noting that the sites chosen by the City during 
the 1990s were located in areas with unemployment rates between 7.6 and 17.5% and poverty rates 
between 17 and 44%). 
149 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11 (there are job training programs at the Center for Green 
Technology and the Chicago Job Corps Center at 3350 South Kedzie Avenue); WALZER, ET AL., supra note 
75, at 96-98 (The authors explain that the site for the California Avenue Business Park was chosen due to 
locational assets, one of which was the high level of unemployment and attendant available labor force.  
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¶36 Other redevelopments, however, seem less locally-oriented.  The ATA Training 
Center includes a hotel, restaurant, and training facilities for airline pilots, attendants, and 
customer service personnel150—jobs not likely to go to area residents.  Likewise, the 
Chicago Center for Green Technology houses an environmental consulting firm and a 
solar panel company—creating positions largely foreclosed to those lacking higher 
education.151  The IUOE provides a new facility for union members,152 which may or may 
not include area residents.  While not harmful to a community, these sites do not fully 
incorporate community members in the benefits of redevelopment. 
¶37 Another deeper question accompanies the “job creation” goal of brownfield 
redevelopment: whether new industrial jobs really benefit a community in the long run.  
The Chicago Brownfields Initiative has focused on re-industrialization of abandoned or 
unused sites.153  Meanwhile, in the economy at large, there has been a systematic 
disinvestment in the nation’s industrial capacity.154  Should this pattern of 
deindustrialization result in the loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector, the Chicago 
Brownfields strategy could end up contributing to central city unemployment in the 
future.155 
¶38 Thus, while the Brownfields Initiative has created many new jobs, there remains 
room for improvement.  Chicago must be vigilant in encouraging development that will 
employ, develop, and fairly compensate the local labor force in a sustainable manner.  
There are a number of ways in which Chicago can make strides towards this goal, and the 
City is empowered to do so through the negotiation process.  For each City-coordinated 
brownfield redevelopment, a negotiation process occurs in which the City and the 
property developers set forth the purposes of the project, work through the financial 
arrangements, examine and often discount the purchase price, evaluate the cost of 
remediation and infrastructure, and then put it all into written form in a redevelopment 
agreement.  During this process, the City has ample opportunity to offer various 
incentives—including reduced purchase prices, grants, subsidies, tax breaks, and 
technical assistance from City personnel—in exchange for agreements regarding 
employment and operations from developers.156 
¶39 One of the most straightforward, and perhaps effective, methods of guaranteeing 
local employment is conditioning City assistance or tax breaks on the number of jobs 
given to locals.157  The City could also incentivize developers or owners to offer 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, the City recognized that the labor pool had a relatively low skill level, and thus a job training 
facility was necessary.  The U.S. Steel/Solo site will also provide job skill training through funding from 
the IL FIRST program to educate employees on current manufacturing technology.). 
150 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 10. 
151 Id. at 6. 
152 Id. at 11. 
153 Id. at 2. 
154 Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and Unequal: A Comment on the Urban Development Aspect of 
Brownfields Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 8 (1996) (describing the shift away from dependence on 
the manufacturing sector and a restructuring of the economy towards new sectors outside of 
manufacturing). 
155 Id. at 18. 
156 WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 90-95. 
157 The state of New York, for example, conditioned tax breaks on the number of jobs created at brownfield 
sites.  This conditional tax break was offered in lieu of general TIF districting.  See Green, supra note 4, at 
594-95.  Such a tax break might have the added benefit of drawing developers to more depressed 
neighborhoods because the financial incentive offered is not contingent on the financial success of the 
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subsidized rent to industrial, commercial, and administrative employers who fill a 
percentage of their positions with local employees.158  In order to truly benefit the 
surrounding community, the City might also consider a requirement, in combination with 
the aforementioned schemes aimed at ensuring employment of locals, that these 
employees are paid a true living wage. 
¶40 The City faces a more complex problem in addressing the type of jobs that will be 
created by brownfield redevelopment.  Reindustrialization of brownfields may be a short-
term solution to a long-term problem,159 and the longevity of the businesses that make 
former brownfields their home will be crucial to their success as community contributors 
and benefactors.  The City thus faces a challenge to find sustainable jobs that are also 
accessible to the local workforce.  A combination of developer selection and job training 
programs could address this issue.  By choosing development partners in a range of 
sectors—industrial, commercial, technical, and administrative—the City could work 
towards ensuring that the jobs brownfield redevelopment creates are economically 
desirable and sustainable.  By incentivizing employers to offer job training programs, or 
by formulating job training programs of their own, the City could work towards filling 
these jobs with local residents. 
ii) Do the New Services and Improvements Benefit Members of the Community? 
¶41 Many of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative sites in which the provision of 
“services”160 was a focus were sites initiated by, or redeveloped in close collaboration 
with, an organized community group.  Columbia Pointe, the Lawndale site, and the 
Bronzeville site provide prime examples of how brownfield redevelopment, prompted by 
community groups and facilitated by the active efforts of the City, can reflect and fulfill 
the needs of the community. 161  It is encouraging that in cases where community groups 
have become involved, their participation has been welcomed and the results have been 
positive.162  In light of this, whenever possible, the City should actively seek out 
community groups and local leaders to spearhead brownfield redevelopments.  By 
providing grants and subsidies for such involvement, the City would put power in the 
hands of communities from the outset of the project.  With local groups initiating 
projects, the needs of the community are likely to be addressed. 
                                                                                                                                                 
development (as with TIFs), but rather on a variable that they can fully control—the percent of their own 
workforce that is local. 
158 This technique was used without City-prompting at the privately-redeveloped former Sears site in west 
Chicago.  See Espinosa, supra note 1. 
159 See supra note 154. 
160 I include affordable housing stock, as well as childcare centers, community programs and centers, 
recreational facilities, and green spaces, within the definition of services. 
161 See De Sousa, supra note 33, at 62 (noting that the development of the Columbia Pointe Homes was 
coordinated by a coalition of not-for-profit community-based organizations, and the Lawndale Christian 
Development Corporation was the motivating force behind the Jubilee Family Resource Center and the 
Carole Robertson Center for Learning); see also Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 21 
(stating that in Bronzeville, the Genesis Housing and Development Corporation, a faith-based organization 
known in its community for dedication to affordable housing for local residents, was the driving force 
behind the City-assisted construction of much-needed housing stock at 707-755 East 40th Street). 
162 Telephone Interview with Mike Charles, supra note 13 (stating that in progressive communities, where 
the community works to piece together funding and partners, they are usually successful); Telephone 
Interview with Keith Harley, supra note 13 (stating that when a community expresses interest, they are 
usually listened to and incorporated into the process). 
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¶42 However, in many other cases, where community groups are less active, it is 
difficult to find any mention of efforts to provide services to a community; and 
unfortunately, it is often the communities least able to organize that are most in need of 
the services and improvements that brownfields redevelopment has the potential to 
offer.163  It is here that the City should make an extra effort to provide such services to the 
community without outside prompting.  The City could use incentives to encourage, or 
make City assistance contingent upon, a developer providing some service or funding to 
the community.  Further, when coordinating the inclusion of such services and amenities, 
the City must take care to ensure that the services are in fact needed and desired by the 
community.  Consulting a community leads to a greater chance of long-term success 
because the redevelopment is filling a void, not forcing a change, and because 
communication fosters a sense of ownership and a stake in the success of the 
redevelopment.164  City-coordinated community involvement in the early stages of 
planning could ensure that maximum benefit is derived from each site.165  Because there 
is no enforceable right under Illinois law for community members to participate in the 
brownfields development process,166 the City should consider instituting an enforceable 
right to involvement in the Chicago Municipal Code.  Without an enforceable public right 
to participation, the community is left without recourse when they are excluded from 
redevelopment discussions, and even if discussions do occur, there is no public record 
maintained of the comments nor obligation to provide the community comments with any 
deference.  Further, the nature of this right to participate should be such that community 
desires and concerns are assessed before the City and the developers start making plans.  
If a community is not informed of a project until the submission of a remedial action 
plan, then the site, the cleanup standard, and the basics of future uses will already have 
been decided without any community input.167  If these threshold decisions are made in a 
vacuum, the services and amenities most useful to the community are unlikely to be 
incorporated into the project.  Chicago should thus offer more than generic public notice 
and comment periods regarding brownfield redevelopments.  The community needs to be 
involved from the start of the process, and actual deference must be granted to 
community suggestions. 
iii) Has Brownfield Redevelopment Led to Gentrification, Pushing out Original 
Residents? 
¶43 According to some observers, redevelopment in Chicago has been synonymous 
with displacement.168  Critics allege that City Hall has followed the lead of downtown 
                                                 
163 Telephone Interview with Mike Charles, supra note 13 (stating that in the most economically depressed 
areas there is a vicious cycle—they need the help the most, but the same circumstances that put them in that 
state in the first place make it more difficult; the forces for change just are not there). 
164 See Felten, supra note 47, at 683-84, for an extensive discussion of why community participation is 
important. 
165 See Felten, supra note 47, at 680; see also Eisen, supra note 7, at 889, 998 (noting that meaningful and 
early community involvement is crucial to the success of brownfields projects and the key to successfully 
engaging a community in a project lies in creating more than mere procedural routines that evince an image 
of cooperation without truly giving a community any influence in the redevelopment process). 
166 U.S. EPA, NO. EPA-560-R-05-001, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS: AN 
UPDATE FROM THE STATES (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pubs/bf_states_r5.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
167 See Eisen, supra note 7. 
168 John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and the 
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corporate interests and the real estate industry, and that the low-income and working class 
enclaves that stand in the way of redevelopment are simply removed and the community 
disbanded.169  Further, as affordable housing stock shrinks and the rental market tightens, 
the concern becomes even more urgent because gentrification may not only force 
residents out of their communities, but also might leave them without a place to go.170  
While the Brownfields Initiative cannot be blamed for this alleged pattern of city-center 
gentrification pushing the poor to the west and inner suburbs,171 there is some indication 
that the brownfields program has perpetuated this problem. 
¶44 Smaller Chicago Brownfields Initiative sites are unlikely to contribute to the 
gentrification of an area to any substantial degree.  For example, at 76th and Parnell 
Streets, six single-family, eighteen two-flat homes, and twelve single-family foster care 
homes were constructed.172  The homes are “moderately-priced” and intended for 
community residents who are first-time home buyers.173  In Bronzeville, thirty-three new 
homes (twenty-one single-family homes and six two-flats) were built, and sixteen of 
these were sold to families who formerly lived in the community but left due to 
stagnation and blight.174  Projects like these are not only geared towards current 
community residents, but their size also makes it unlikely that they will substantially 
change the character of the neighborhood and push area residents out. 
¶45 Larger redevelopment projects, however, bear an increased risk of causing 
gentrification and displacement.  Columbia Pointe, upon completion, created 260 new 
residential units, 20% of which are reserved as affordable housing.175  While the intent of 
the redevelopment was to expand area housing options for a mix of income levels and 
promote economic opportunity for the local community, concern arose early amongst 
neighborhood residents that there was a need for more affordable housing and that too 
many condominiums were replacing subsidized rental housing, pricing residents out of 
their own neighborhood.176  Though these concerns were discussed with community 
stakeholders,177 the percentage of designated affordable housing was never changed and 
the units, none of which were rental, sold for between $200,000 and $400,000 soon after 
completion.178  In a neighborhood such as Woodlawn, in which 39% of the residents live 
below the poverty level and only 28% of households have annual incomes of more than 
$35,000,179 housing in a large new-construction development like Columbia Pointe is 
                                                                                                                                                 
K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 463 (2003). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 463-64.  In 2003, there was a city-wide gap of 155,000 affordable housing units, and 16,000 
Section 8 unit contracts expired in 2005, following the loss of 46,000 units over the prior decade despite a 
112,000 population increase.  Compounding this problem, there was only a 4% vacancy rate.  With the 
tightening of the rental market, rental prices will naturally rise with demand.  Many lower income renters 
will become priced out of the rental market unless City-landlord affordability agreements and Section 8 
contracts, which mandate affordable units, are maintained.  Id. 
171 Id. at 464 (noting that new expensive housing is being built and concentrations of poverty are moving 
farther west, southwest, and into the inner ring of suburbs). 
172 Chicago Brownfields Initiative, supra note 11, at 19. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 21. 
175 De Sousa, supra note 33, at 61. 
176 Id. at 64. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 61, 64. 
179 Id. at 61. 
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inaccessible to a majority of the existing residents and is likely to contribute to 
gentrification that could eventually push these residents from their community. 
¶46 At University Village, a similar situation resulted in a boycott of the project by a 
number of community groups.180  Hundreds of vendors who had operated in the area were 
displaced by the redevelopment, and locals feared that the new residents would alter the 
fabric of the surrounding neighborhood and cause exclusionary displacement of the 
original residents and businesses.181  The controversy eventually subsided, and 21% of the 
units were designated to be in the affordable range, but the 930 units (ranging in price 
from $165,900 to $1,299,900182) were marketed as a planned community and were sold 
overwhelmingly to University of Illinois, Chicago faculty and staff, staff from nearby 
hospitals, city employees, and suburbanites moving back to the City.183  This large 
redevelopment, which also included restaurants, shops, academic buildings, and student 
housing, is inherently different from the mixture of immigrant culture, commerce, and 
enterprise that formerly occupied the space,184 and neighborhood residents do not 
consider the redeveloped area “part of the neighborhood anymore.”185 
¶47 North Town Village, built on the abandoned site of a former service station, 
manufacturing facility, and machine shop, was part of the Chicago’s Plan for 
Transformation.186  It was slated to replace some of the residential units that would be 
destroyed with the razing of the Cabrini Green high-rises.187  Two-hundred and sixty-one 
residential units were constructed and divided into three categories: Fifty percent private 
for-sale units, twenty percent affordable units, and thirty percent replacement public 
housing units.188  While the project has been called a “model of mixed income residential 
integration,” some insist that poor people are being forced to move elsewhere as 
affordable properties to rent become less and less available.189 
¶48 The issues of affordable housing and gentrification are much larger than the scope 
of this Comment, and although brownfield projects are but a small part of the larger 
patterns, they are not exempt from scrutiny in this arena.  Each of the above-mentioned 
brownfield projects incorporated affordability agreements into redevelopment 
arrangements, but large-scale projects such as these are inherently likely to alter the 
                                                 
180 Id. at 68.  In 2000, several coalitions, including the Coalition to Protect Public Housing, the Maxwell 
Street Historic Preservation Coalition, and the St. Francis of Assisi Preservation Committee, boycotted the 
project in an effort to get developers to address issues related to affordable housing for the very poor and 
displaced residents, to give existing businesses an opportunity to remain in the area, and to preserve the 
sixty historic buildings on Maxwell Street.  Note that University Village was not an official Chicago 
Brownfields Initiative project—the project was initiated by private developers who then worked with the 
City to acquire financial and technical assistance and complete the redevelopment.  Id. 
181 Id. at 67. 
182 Id. at 65. 
183 Id. at 67. 
184 Id. at 65. 
185 Powell & Spencer, supra note 168, at 464. 
186 WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 100.  The Plan for Transformation is the Chicago Housing 
Authority’s blueprint for reinventing public housing in the city.  It was approved by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development in 2000 and represents the largest reconstruction of public housing in the 
nation’s history.  See CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION, available at 
http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/plan_summary.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2008). 
187 WALZER, ET AL., supra note 75, at 100. 
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189 Powell & Spencer, supra note 168, at 464 (quoting Daniel Bassil of Cabrini Connections, a tutoring and 
mentoring program for at-risk youth). 
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nature of a neighborhood and increase area property values.  By pursuing more small-
scale infill projects, the City could avoid such sweeping neighborhood transformations 
and bring only a reasonable number of outsiders into an existing community.  The City 
should seek to do so.  Finding appropriate sites for smaller infill projects should not be 
difficult, as the majority of brownfields are not large industrial sites, but parcels where 
dry cleaners, gas stations, or auto mechanics once were located. 
¶49 However, even if more time and effort is focused on such infill projects, the City 
must still address the accessibility of brownfield developments of all sizes to current 
neighborhood residents.  Again, the most direct and effective way to do so is by using 
incentives during the negotiation process to influence redevelopment agreements.  By 
offering carrots such as reduced purchase prices, cleanup assistance, and infrastructure 
grants, the City can convince developers to provide truly affordable housing and rental 
options.  This could be done independently during brownfield development negotiations 
and planning, or it could be done in conjunction with the Chicago Housing Authority 
(CHA), which is currently in the process of replacing high-rise public housing with “new 
mixed-income communities with contemporary town homes and low-rise buildings 
where public housing residents will live in the same neighborhood as people who 
purchase market rate and affordable homes.”190  Generally, these CHA developments 
consist of one-third public housing, one-third affordable housing, and one-third market 
rate homes.191  Brownfield redevelopments, due to location, infrastructure, and available 
private investment, offer an ideal opportunity for creating these types of communities. 
¶50 In addition to the gentrification concerns addressed thus far, physical displacement 
of community members can also be caused by increasing property values and taxes and, 
as at University Village, by the forced removal of residents and vendors.  Such physical 
displacement must be minimized.  The City should tread very carefully with respect to 
any project that threatens to move current area residents from homes or businesses, and 
should perhaps consider barring these projects entirely.  The City may also consider 
entering into agreements with current neighborhood residents to freeze or moderate 
property taxes at a rate which would allow them to afford to stay in the neighborhood 
despite surrounding redevelopment.  Overall, the City must be conscious of the 
community that exists near each brownfield and use the incentives at its disposal to direct 
redevelopment away from damaging gentrification. 
iv) Is Site Remediation Sufficient to Protect Community Health and Safety? 
¶51 Much has been written on the environmental justice issues surrounding brownfield 
redevelopment.  Because states often offer relaxed cleanup standards, streamlined 
administrative procedures, and releases from future liability to spur development and 
reuse, voluntary brownfield cleanups may involve trading increased health risks for the 
prospect of economic improvements.192  The environmental and human health concerns 
raised by the Chicago program are similar to those associated with most brownfields 
programs and legislation.  Because the site-specific TACO approach is used in Illinois, 
there is significant flexibility with respect to cleanup standards depending upon the 
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Vol. 3:2] Jessica Higgins 
 261
expected post-development use of a site.193  Under Illinois brownfield legislation, each 
site must be cleaned to a level that is considered safe enough for the developer’s self-
identified next use.194  At each site, the IEPA evaluates the consequences of leaving 
certain contaminants at the site with or without certain controls, and an engineer must 
certify that the selected cleanup methods are sufficient to protect human health and the 
environment.195  While the TACO cleanup standards for brownfields are fairly 
conservative, there remains concern that lowered standards may expose neighbors to 
contaminants. 
¶52 Additionally, when a site is remediated with only the next use in mind, the future 
use of the property is restricted to that (or a similar) use.  This practice raises two issues: 
(1) concern that the restriction will be forgotten or ignored, exposing future users to 
contamination; and (2) concern that the property will be locked into one future use that 
may prevent the property from being put to the most beneficial use for the community. 196  
For example, residential sites are subject to higher cleanup standards than sites that will 
host industrial facilities.197  Should a site be redeveloped for industrial use, unless 
substantial additional cleanup is done at a later date, the land will never be available for 
residential development.  Even at residential sites, the method of cleanup can restrict 
future uses.  At the Parnell Place site, one section of contaminated soil was allowed to 
remain on the site but covered with a three foot barrier to eliminate exposure at the 
surface.198  The decision to cap, instead of remove, the contaminated soil was made 
because it was not necessary to put water or sewer lines in the parcel, and capping 
requires less time and resources than excavating the soil.199  Consequently, the insertion 
of underground utilities will never be an option at the site.200  More specific concerns 
regarding the environmental health of Chicago’s brownfield sites include the fact that 
remediators and redevelopers do not have to consider whether drinking water may be 
drawn from the site at any point in the future,201 and that the program allows developers to 
segment portions of a brownfield, remediate a “fenced off” section, and disregard the 
effects on neighbors still exposed to the contamination present in the unremediated 
sections.202 
¶53 While some flexibility is necessary in order to make projects fiscally approachable, 
allowing different remediation standards and control techniques presents questions of 
environmental justice, long-term community well-being, and sustainability.  The City 
should use the powerful incentives at their disposal to discourage developers from 
locking a site into a single future use and to encourage the most complete assessments 
and cleanups practicable.  The City might also consider establishing a baseline cleanup 
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standard to ensure that no project will endanger the health and safety of the surrounding 
community. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶54 The Chicago Brownfields Initiative has achieved remarkable success in many 
different areas.  It has created jobs, reduced environmental hazards, provided useful 
services, and brought numerous vacant sites back into productive use.  Yet there remains 
room for improvement.  As Chicago moves forward with additional brownfields projects, 
the City must be conscious of maximizing the economic, environmental, and social 
benefits that brownfield redevelopment can provide a community.  Because Chicago has 
taken the initiative to seek out, coordinate, and incentivize its own brownfields projects, 
the City is in a prime position to guide developers and stakeholders in a direction that 
remains true to the goal of brownfield redevelopment—economic and environmental 
improvement to the benefit of surrounding communities.  By encouraging the 
development of sustainable sources of local employment, involving the surrounding 
communities in early and meaningful discourse, steering residential development away 
from gentrification, and demanding a high standard of remediation, the City of Chicago 
can improve its already successful brownfields program, and in doing so, continue to 
provide a progressive model of brownfield redevelopment for other cites across the 
country. 
